Key points of SC ruling:
[] A 2026 ruling of the Supreme Court acquits a critic of a Quezon town mayor because the mayor failed to prove actual malice.
[] The accused, convicted by RTC in a decision the C.A. later affirmed, was cleared by the SC, which ruled the accuser had to prove actual malice and the mayor did not.
[] Good news to non-journalist users of social media who are sued for cyber-libel: They don’t have to prove absence of malice or claim privileged communication. It’s the prosecution that must prove actual malice “once it is established that the complainant is a public officer.”
[] Acquittal granted despite evidence the accused had apologized to the mayor twice (in Facebook and on a billboard) and would pay P50,000 to the mayor under a compromise agreement.
WHAT WENT BEFORE. Jade Karla Kabangon Tan was convicted of libel on May 14, 2019 by the Regional Trial Court in Catanauan, Quezon. She was meted the jail sentence of four years to six years and a fine of P40,000.
Tan wrote in her Facebook posts that the then mayor, Atty. Ramon A. Orfanel, wanted grease or bribe money (“padulas”) for Tan’s family to get building, business and other permits.
The Court of Appeals, to which Tan raised the case, in its March 14, 2022 decision and February 10, 2023 resolution, denied the appeal and affirmed “in toto” (entirely) the RTC decision.
Tan went up the Supreme Court, where she filed a “petition for review on certiorari,” assailing the C.A. ruling, which supported the RTC finding of guilty against the accused.
EARLY THIS YEAR, on January 13, 2026 – when the decision was promulgated although it was uploaded at the official portal only on July 29 and reported by news media a few days ago – the SC acquitted Tan of the crime of cyber-libel.
TAKEAWAYS. Here are the more interesting takeaways from the case of Jade Carla Cabangon Tan vs. People of the Philippines (G.R.#265929):
[1] SC saw what RTC and C.A. didn’t see or they saw differently: about malice.
The three courts all agreed the first three elements of libel – defamation, publication and identification – were present.
But unlike the RTC and C.A., the Supreme Court saw absence of malice or, more precisely, didn’t believe that the prosecution proved actual malice.
RTC ruled that it was evident Tan maligned the mayor “without verifying the veracity of her allegations prior to making them.”
C.A. ruled there was malice because Tan had a grudge against the mayor over an aborted family business deal and thus had the motive to defame Orfanel.
The SC though ruled that those circumstances didn’t “show beyond reasonable doubt that actual malice was present.”
They “didn’t prove that the petitioner knew that her statements were false or that she acted with reckless disregard of whether they were false.”
The difference of appreciation by the three courts on actual malice apparently brings up anew the puzzler:
Which can judge more efficiently intent or motive of the alleged perpetrator? In this case, perspective of judges closer to the facts differs from that of judges looking at them farther away.
[2] Big boost to non-journalists: no presumption of malice; actual malice must be proved.
The defamatory posts of Tan, under the Revised Penal Code, were presumed to be malicious even if true. Malice in law may be torn down with contrary proof of “good intention and justifiable motive.”
Same thing with journalists burdened by disproving malice in law. Yet journalists and similarly-occupied workers in media may rightfully claim “privileged communication” which, once established, shifts the burden of proof to the accuser/prosecutor.
In Tan vs. People, the SC declared (with strong emphasis) that the highest court --
--- “Has imposed a higher standard for criminal libel when the complainant is a public officer. Actual malice – knowledge that the defamatory statement was false, or with reckless disregard as to its falsity –must be proved.”
---” It is the burden of the prosecution to prove actual malice, not the defense’s to disprove.”
A principle enunciated also in Daquer vs. People and Guinguing vs. Court of Appeals.
Accused Tan -- plain citizen and taxpayer, not a journalist with duty to report or comment on actuations of public officers – had only to show that her accuser was a public official.
Once it is established that the complainant is a public figure, the SC, citing Guingguing vs. C.A., said “the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that there is actual malice on the part of the accused.”
Tan didn’t have to establish privileged communication. Or she must have been deemed to be in that legal state when she posted her complaint about the mayor.
[3] Right to free press, free speech very much influenced SC ruling.
The SC in Tan vs. People has more than the usual sprinkling of paeans for free press and free speech. Exult over these, defenders of freedom of expression:
--- Citing Tulfo vs. People, the SC repeated: “Criminal prosecutions for libel must ensure that the right to free expression and free press are not violated.” “Libel laws must not be (so) broadly construed as to deter comments on public affairs and the conduct of public officials.”
--- Citing Daquer vs. People, the SC intoned: “The fundamental right of free expression tempers the law on libel.”
--- Citing the all-time favorite of judges, US vs. Bustos, the SC preached anew: “The checks on government are not confined to the three branches of government.” “The people – as citizens, electors, taxpayers – have an equal stake in participative democracy.” It’s not just about freedom of expression. It’s also about “accountability to the people,” which is “demanded by the Constitution itself.”
(4) The “constant watchdog” apparently is not just the press.
“Public opinion is the constant source of liberty and democracy,” the SC in the Tan ruling cited, which must mean opinion directly from the public, not just opinion coursed through the media, enjoys similar protection under the right to free expression.
(5) SC ruled for Tan despite “other circumstances” tending to show she was guilty.
Tan had already testified that Tan made two public apologies: one on Facebook and the other on “a big billboard.”
(The billboard apology must have drawn humorous comments from those who saw it. It required larger capacity for humiliation and torment than an apology in social media or a newspaper would’ve.)
The other thing that conceded wrongdoing: a “compromise agreement” between Tan and the mayor (who interestingly were relatives) that promised a P50,000 compensation from the accused to the accuser.
[6] The question whether to impose a fine, instead of a jail sentence, became unnecessary with Tan’s acquittal.
SC’s Administrative Circular #08-2008 sets “a rule of preference” for judges in libel cases to lean toward imposing a fine instead of imprisonment “when the circumstances of the case justify it, serving the best interests of justice.”
With Tan’s acquittal, the justices didn’t have to make a choice between fine and jail term.
[7] Obiter dictum on criminal libel: why courts still apply the law.
Just like the prescriptive period of libel and cyber-libel, the SC said in an obiter dictum (“in passing”) that only Congress can lift the “continuing recognition” of criminal libel. “As long as it operates within the bounds of the Constitution, the court’s duty is to apply it.”